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Abstract: This paper quantitatively examines the e⁄ects of two exogenous driving forces, investment-speci￿c
technological change (ISTC) and the demographic change known as ￿the baby boom and the baby bust,￿on
the evolution of the skill premium in the postwar U.S. economy. I develop an overlapping generations general
equilibrium model with endogenous discrete schooling choice. The production technology features capital-
skill complementarity as in Krusell et al. (2000). ISTC, through capital-skill complementarity, raises the
relative demand for skilled labor, while demographic variation a⁄ects the skill premium through changing the
age structure and hence relative supply of skilled labor. I ￿nd that demographic change is more important
in shaping the skill premium before 1980. Since then, ISTC takes over to drive the dramatic increase in the
skill premium.
JEL classi￿cation: E25 (Aggregate factor income distribution); I21 (Analysis of education); J24 (Human
capital); J31 (Wage di⁄erentials by skill); O33 (Technological change).
Key Words: Skill Premium; Schooling Choice; Capital-Skill Complementarity; Investment-Speci￿c Techno-
logical Change; Demographic Change.
1 Introduction
The skill premium, which is de￿ned as the ratio of skilled labor (workers holding college degrees) wage to
unskilled labor (workers holding high school diplomas) wage, has gone through dramatic changes in the
postwar U.S. economy. As Figure 1 (taken from Acemoglu (2003)) shows, starting from 1949 the evolution
of the skill premium exhibited an ￿N￿shape: it increased in the 1950s and 1960s, then decreased throughout
the 1970s, and has increased dramatically since then. Meanwhile, as is also shown in the ￿gure, the relative
supply of skilled labor (the ratio of weeks worked by skilled labor to unskilled labor) has been increasing
over time.
A number of researchers have asked why the pattern of the skill premium looks like it does. Popu-
lar explanations include investment-speci￿c technological change through capital-skill complementarity (see
￿Mailing Address: Department of Economics, University of Hawaii, 2424 Maile Way, Saunders Hall 542, Honolulu, HI 96822.
E-mail: huihe@hawaii.edu.
1Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000), hereafter KORV), international trade induced skill-biased
technological change (Acemoglu (2003)), and skill-biased technological change associated with the computer
revolution (Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998)). Probably the most popular story is the one proposed in Katz
and Murphy (1992). They claim that a simple supply and demand framework can explain the dynamics of
the skill premium: ￿A smooth secular increase in the relative demand for college graduates combined with
the observed ￿ uctuations in the rate of growth of relative supply could potentially explain the movements in
the college wage premium from 1963 to 1987.￿ 1 (Katz and Murphy (1992), page 50.) Table 1 (taken from Au-
tor, Katz, and Krueger (1998)) demonstrates the basic idea. Since 1950 there has been steady growth in the
relative demand for skilled labor,2 but the growth rate of the relative supply of skilled labor has ￿ uctuated.
This growth rate was quite stable from 1940 to 1970 at around 2.5% per year, then increased dramatically
to 4.99% per year during the 1970s, and it dropped back to the original average after 1980. Therefore, if
we put the supply and demand changes together, we will see that the relative price of skilled labor, that is,
the skill premium, dropped during the 1970s, (since supply exceeded demand,) while it increased in other
decades.
Why did the relative supply of skilled labor increase dramatically during the 1970s? Katz and Murphy
attribute this pattern to the baby boom. High fertility rates in the U.S. from 1946 to around 1960 resulted in
a huge increase in the number of college graduates in the labor force since the late 1960s. In turn, the passage
of the baby boom cohorts into mid-career, together with the accelerating skill-biased technological change
in the 1980s, contributed to the rising college wage premium since 1980. In other words, the demographic
change, together with the trend in skill-biased technological change, explains the dynamics of the skill
premium.
But what is the source of the skill-biased technological change? KORV (2000) suggest an explanation.
Modeling capital-skill complementarity in a neoclassical aggregate production function, they claim that the
growth in the stock of capital equipment will complementarily increase the marginal product of skilled labor
and hence raise its relative demand. They quantitatively evaluate how much this capital-skill complemen-
tarity has a⁄ected the skill premium from 1963 to 1992 and ￿nd that changes in observed factor inputs can
account for most of the variation in the skill premium over these 30 years.
However, which driving force is more important in shaping the skill premium in the di⁄erent periods
remains an unexplored topic. This paper ￿ll the void by asking a quantitative question: to what extent
can skill-biased technological change and demographic change account for the dynamics of the skill premium,
respectively?
The demographic change a⁄ects the skill premium mainly through changes in relative supply of skilled
labor, while skill-biased technological change drives the skill premium via changes in relative demand for
skilled labor. In order to evaluate the impacts from both sources, I have to endogenize relative supply
and demand of skilled labor. Therefore, I develop a general equilibrium overlapping generations model
1Goldin and Katz (2007) echoes this idea in explaining the whole twentieth century history of wage inequality.
2Katz and Murphy (1992) ￿nd that this secular growth in the relative demand for college graduates can be proxied by a
linear time trend of 3.3% per year, which can be viewed as a proxy for skill-biased technological change (SBTC). But what
drives this secular trend remains a ￿black box￿in their paper and in subsequent work along this line. For example, Bound and
Johnson (1992) also attribute much of the variation in the skill premium to a residual trend component that is interpreted as
SBTC.
2Period Relative Wage (%) Relative Supply (%) Relative Demand (%)
1950-60 0.83 2.91 4.08
1960-70 0.69 2.55 3.52
1970-80 -0.74 4.99 3.95
1980-90 1.51 2.53 4.65
1990-98 0.36 2.25 2.76
Table 1: Growth of College/High School Relative Wage, Supply and Demand: 1950-1998 (Annualized Percent
Changes)
with endogenous discrete schooling choice. The model includes three key features. First, with ex-ante
heterogeneity in the disutility cost of schooling, individuals in each birth cohort (high school graduates)
choose to go to college or not based on their expected future wage di⁄erentials, their forgone wages during
the college years, their tuition payments, and their idiosyncratic disutility cost. This microfoundation gives
us the standard features found in the human capital investment literature. (See, for instance, Ben-Porath
(1967).) Second, the production technology has the feature of capital-skill complementarity as in KORV
(2000), that is, capital is more complementary to skilled than unskilled labor. Third, following Greenwood,
Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997, hereafter GHK), I assume existence of investment-speci￿c technological change,
i.e., a technological change on investment goods.
Under this theoretical framework, I calibrate the model and then quantitatively examine the e⁄ects of
two exogenous forces, investment-speci￿c technological change (ISTC) as described above and demographic
change as represented by the growth rate of the cohort size of high school graduates, on the skill premium
over the U.S. post-war period. I ￿nd that demographic change dwarfs ISTC before the late 1960s and
accounts for about one-third of the decline in the skill premium in the 1970s. However, after the late 1970s
ISTC takes over to drive the dramatic increase in the skill premium.
In this model, ISTC a⁄ects the skill premium through a simple economic mechanism.3 When ISTC speeds
up, investment becomes increasingly e¢ cient over time, so the relative price of the capital stock falls. This
encourages higher investment and hence the capital stock increases. Due to capital-skill complementarity,
an increase in the capital stock raises the relative demand for skilled labor, which raises the skill premium.
However, in the general equilibrium framework of this model, rising skill premium will also induce forward-
looking individuals more likely go to college and hence increase the relative supply of skilled labor, which
tends to o⁄set the increase in the skill premium.
Demographic change a⁄ects the skill premium through a di⁄erent channel. Growing birth cohorts (￿baby
boom￿ ) change the age structure in the economy and make it skew towards younger (college-aged population)
cohorts. On the one hand, more people stay in college. Meanwhile more unskilled workers join the labor
force. Therefore, the relative supply of skilled labor decreases, which tends to raise the skill premium. On
3Fernandez-Villaverde (2001) proposes a similar mechanism, but targets on a totally di⁄erent question. He tries to answer
why growth in per capita income has coexisted with a decline in fertility during the past 150 years. The idea is that capital-
speci￿c technological change brings more productive capital, which, through capital-skill complementarity, raises the skill
premium (i.e., return to human capital). The increment in the skill premium induces parents to choose more education instead
of more children, hence causing the decline in fertility.
3the other hand, young people hold fewer assets over their life cycle, and thus the change in age structure
also slows down asset accumulation. The decrease in capital stock, through capital-skill complementarity,
tends to lower the skill premium.
Since both driving forces have opposite impacts on the skill premium, total e⁄ect of each force on the
skill premium thus is ambiguous and has to be investigated quantitatively.
In quantitative terms, before the late 1960s the U.S. had undergone dramatic population growth (see
Figure 2 and 3), while the change in ISTC was only moderate (see Figure 12). Demographic change out-
weighed technological change, and hence it dominated the impact on the skill premium. After the late
1970s, the magnitude of the baby bust was much smaller compared to the baby boom, while ISTC speeded
up dramatically to become the major driving force.
This paper extends the existing literature on the e⁄ects of skill-biased technological change on wage
inequalities. In comparison to KORV (2000), I endogenize the supply of skilled labor and put their aggregate
production function into a dynamic general equilibrium setup. Therefore, the model is able to capture the
dynamic interaction between the skill premium and realtive supply of skilled labor. And only under this
framework, we are able to quantify the relative importance of the two widely discussed driving forces, ISTC
that was highlighted by KORV, and the demographic change that has been ignored by their paper, in shaping
the dynamics of the skill premium.
In spirit, this paper is also close to Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998). They develop and estimate an
overlapping generations general equilibrium model of labor earnings and skill formation with heterogenous
human capital. They test their framework by building into the model a baby boom in entry cohorts and
an estimated time trend of increase in the skill bias of aggregate technology. They ￿nd that the model
can explain the pattern of wage inequality since the early 1960s. However, they do not provide a micro-
foundation about the source of skill-biased technological change as in this paper. They also do not ask the
research question on quantitative decomposition of impacts of ISTC and demographic change on the skill
premium.4
This paper extends He and Liu (2008), who provide a uni￿ed framework in which the dynamics of the
relative supply of skilled labor and the skill premium arise as an equilibrium outcome driven by measured
investment-speci￿c technological change. This paper provides a microeconomic foundation for He and Liu
(2008) by going deeper into the college choices that determine the supply of skilled labor. An overlapping
generations framework is used here so that I can quantify the e⁄ect of demographic change, which is missing
in He and Liu (2008).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents some stylized facts about the
dynamics of the cohort size of high school graduates, the college enrollment rate, and college tuition in
the postwar U.S. economy. It also emphasizes linkages among these facts. Section 3 presents the economic
4Several other papers follow Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) to emphasize the impact of skill-biased technological
change on the skill premium. For example, Guvenen and Kuruscu (2006) present a tractable general equilibrium overlapping
generations model of human capital accumulation that is consistent with several features of the evolution of the U.S. wage
inequality from 1970 to 2000. Their work shares a similar micro-foundation of schooling choice as in this paper. But they
do not have capital stock in the production technology, and hence no capital-skill complementarity. The only driving force in
their paper is skill-biased technological change, which is calibrated to match the total rise in wage inequality in the U.S. data
between 1969 and 1995.
4model of college-going decisions, describes the market environment, and de￿nes the general equilibrium in
the model economy, thus laying out the theoretical foundation for the later data analysis and calibration
exercise. Section 4 shows how to parameterize the model economy. Section 5 provides calibration results for
the pre-1951 steady state. Section 6 computes the transition path of the model economy from 1951 to 2000
and compares the results with the data. It also conducts some counterfactual experiments to isolate the
e⁄ects of investment-speci￿c technological change and demographic change on the skill premium. Finally,
Section 7 concludes.
2 Stylized Facts
This section summarizes the data pattern regarding the college choice which determines the supply of skilled
labor. Figure 2 shows the cohort size of high school graduates. It was very stable before the early 1950s,
then increased until 1976, and has decreased since then. Since the common age of high school graduation
is around 18, we can view this graph as a 18-year lag version of U.S. fertility growth, that is, it re￿ ects the
baby boom and baby bust.5
Figure 3 measures the college-age population. I report the age 17-21 and 18-21 population in the U.S.
since 1955. These series follow a similar pattern as in Figure 2. The baby boom pushed the college-aged
population up until the fertility rate reached its peak around 1960, corresponding to the peak of the college-
aged population around 1980. The baby bust then dragged the population size down.
The two ￿gures above show changes in the population base of potential college students, but does the
proportion of people going to college change over time? Figure 4 shows the college enrollment rate of recent
high school graduates. It began growing in the early 1950s until 1968, when it started to decline; the entire
1970s was a depressed decade for college enrollment, and it was not until 1985 that the enrollment rate
exceeded the level in 1968. Starting from 1980, the enrollment rate kept increasing for nearly 20 years. This
pattern is also con￿rmed by other studies. (See Macunovich (1996) Figures 1.a, 1.b, 2.a, and 2.b, and Card
and Lemieux (2000) Figure 3.)
Combining Figure 3 and 4, we can see the dramatic increase of the relative supply of skilled labor in the
1970s is due to a combination of accumulative rising college-age population and college enrollment rate in
the 1960s. The demographic change only a⁄ects the cohort size of college-aged population (in this paper I
restrict the college age to be 18-21 years old). Higher enrollment rate shifts the proportion of the colleg-age
population into the skilled labor. The college enrollment rate thus is an important determinant of the relative
supply of skilled labor.
By comparing the skill premium in Figure 1 and the college enrollment rate in Figure 4, one can see
that they share a very similar pattern. This similarity implies a tight link between the college-going decision
and the expected skill premium. The expected skill premium represents the expected gain from higher
education. As the expected bene￿ts increase, the enrollment rate increases. This ￿nding motivates me to
explicitly endogenize the college choice in the model. As Goldin and Katz (2007) point out, understanding
changes in the relative supply of skilled labor is crucial in economic analysis of changes in wage structure
5Cohort size has been increasing again since 1995 because the baby boomers￿ children reached college age around the
mid-1990s.
5and returns to skill. In order to understand the evolution of skill premium, we cannot ignore the impact
from the supply side.
To fully understand the determinants of schooling choice, we should also look at the cost side of college-
going. In Figure 5 I report the real tuition, fees, room, and board (TFRB) per student charged by an average
four-year institution (average means the enrollment weighted average of four-year public and private higher
education institutions; see Appendix A for details). Again, we see a pattern similar to that of the skill
premium and the college enrollment rate. TFRB increased over time except in the 1970s. Starting in 1980,
real TFRB has raised dramatically.
The similarity is not surprising since it re￿ ects supply and demand in the higher education market.
Higher demand for skilled labor in the 1980s and 1990s pushed up the skill premium as we see in Figure
1. More people wanted to go to college, hence the enrollment rate increased as shown in Figure 4. In turn,
higher demand for college education raised the price of college education, as shown in Figure 5.
The stylized facts relevant to this paper can be brie￿ y summarized as follows:
1. The skill premium rose during the 1950s and 1960s, then fell from 1971 to 1979, and has increased
dramatically since 1980.
2. The relative supply of skilled labor has increased since the 1940s.
3. The college enrollment rate exhibits a similar pattern as the skill premium, as do tuition payments.
The stylized facts about the skill premium observed in Figure 1 is the target of this paper. To answer the
quantitative question raised in Section 1, I will take the demographic change in Figure 2 and the measured
investment-speci￿c technological change in Figure 12 as exogenously given, feed them into a dynamic general
equilibrium model, and see what percentage of change in the skill premium can be explained by each of these
two exogenous forces.
3 Model
In this section, I present the economic model that will be used later for calibration. It is a discrete-time
overlapping generations (OLG) model. Individuals make the schooling choice in the ￿rst period. There is
only one good in the economy that can be used in either consumption or investment.
3.1 Demographics
The economy is populated by overlapping generations. People enter the economy when they are 18 years
old and ￿nish high school, which I call the birth cohort and model as age j = 1. I assume people work up to
age J, which is the maximum life span.6 To distinguish between the age of a cohort and the calendar time,
I use j for the age, and t for the calendar time. For example, Nj;t is the population size of the age-j cohort
at time t.
6In an unreported experiment, I extend the current model to include retirement, social security, and lifetime uncertainty.
The quantitative results are very similar to the ones presented here, while the lifecycle pro￿les of consumption and asset holdings
are more realistic (hump-shaped). Please also refer to the sensitivity analysis in Section 6.3.
6In every period t a new birth cohort enters the economy with cohort size N1;t. It grows at rate nt.
Therefore, I have
N1;t = (1 + nt)N1;t￿1: (1)









This fraction will be used to calculate the aggregate quantities in the economy as cohort weights throughout
the transition path.
The birth cohort in the model corresponds to the high school graduates (HSG) in Figure 2, and the
growth rate of HSG cohort size is the data counterpart of nt. Therefore, the ￿baby boom￿corresponds to
the 1951-1976 period when nt increased over time, while the ￿baby bust￿period is from 1976 to 1990 when
nt decreased over time.
3.2 Preferences












The parameter ￿ is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, therefore 1
￿ is the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. Since leisure does not enter into the utility function, each individual will supply all her labor
endowment, which is normalized to be one.
3.3 Budget Constraints
An individual born at time t chooses whether or not to go to college at the beginning of the ￿rst period. I
use s 2 fc;hg to indicate this choice. If an individual chooses s = h; she ends up with a high school diploma
and goes on the job market to work as an unskilled worker up to age J, and earns high school graduate
wage sequence fwh
j;t+j￿1gJ
j=1. Alternatively, she can choose s = c; spend the ￿rst four periods in college as
a full-time student, and pay the tuition. I assume that an individual enters college will successfully graduate
from college (there is no college dropout in the model). After college, she goes on the job market to ￿nd
a job as a skilled worker and earns a college graduate wage sequence fwc
j;t+j￿1gJ
j=1. After the schooling
choice, within each period, an individual makes consumption and asset accumulation decisions according to
her choice.
For s = c; the budget constraints of the cohort born at time t are
cj;t+j￿1 + tuitiont+j￿1 + aj;t+j￿1 ￿ (1 + rt+j￿1)aj￿1;t+j￿2 8j = 1;2;3;4 (4)
cj;t+j￿1 + aj;t+j￿1 ￿ (1 + rt+j￿1)aj￿1;t+j￿2 + wc
t+j￿1"c
j 8j = 5;:::;J (5)
cj;t+j￿1 ￿ 0;a0;t￿1 = 0;aJ;t+J￿1 ￿ 0;
7where f"c
jgJ
j=5 is the age e¢ ciency pro￿le of college graduates. It represents the age pro￿le of the average
labor productivity for college graduates. Notice that individuals have zero initial wealth and cannot die in
debt.7
For s = h; the budget constraints of the cohort born at time t are
cj;t+j￿1 + aj;t+j￿1 ￿ (1 + rt+j￿1)aj￿1;t+j￿2 + wh
t+j￿1"h
j 8j = 1;:::;J (6)
cj;t+j￿1 ￿ 0;a0;t￿1 = 0;aJ;t+J￿1 ￿ 0:
Similarly, f"h
jgJ
j=1 is the age e¢ ciency pro￿le of high school graduates.
3.4 Schooling Choice
Next, I would like to explicitly model an individual￿ s schooling choice. In order to generate a positive
enrollment rate in the model, I need to introduce some ex-ante heterogeneity within each birth cohort.
Without this within-cohort heterogeneity, the enrollment rate would be either zero or one.
Following Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998), I assume that di⁄erent individuals within each birth
cohort are endowed with di⁄erent levels of disutility cost of schooling. I index people by their disutility level
i 2 [0;1], and the associated disutility cost that individual i bears is DIS(i). I assume DIS0(i) < 0.8 The
Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of disutility cost is denoted by F, F(i0) = Pr(i ￿ i0): Now an








1 if si = c
0 if si = h
;
subject to the conditional budget constraints (4)-(5) or (6), depending on individual i￿ s schooling choice
si. Notice that idiosyncratic disutility cost DIS(i) does not enter into the budget constraints, so everyone
within the same cohort and with the same education status will have the same lifetime utility derived from
physical consumption, which simpli￿es the computation. I use UTILc
t to denote the discounted lifetime
utility derived from people who are born at time t and choose to go to college (s = c) and UTILh
t to denote
the discounted lifetime utility derived from people who choose not to go to college (s = h). Therefore,
UTILc
t ￿ UTILh
t represents the utility gain from attending college. Obviously, individual i will choose go
to college if DIS(i) < [UTILc
t ￿ UTILh
t ]; will not go if DIS(i) > [UTILc
t ￿ UTILh




It is easy to show that this model implies
UTILc
t ￿ UTILh
t T 0 i⁄ NPVt T 0;
7Notice that the model does not have exogenous (ad hoc) borrowing constraints. However, the standard properties of the
utility function and the restriction that the agent cannot die in debt impose an endogenous (natural) borrowing constraint at
every period.
8Navarro (2007) ￿nds ability is the main determinant of this ￿psychic￿cost and it plays a key role in determining schooling
decisions. High ability individuals face very low disutility cost while low ability individuals face large disutility cost of attending



























Here NPV stands for the net present value of higher education. It consists of three terms. The ￿rst term
represents the bene￿t of schooling, as college graduates can earn more through the skill premium. The
second term represents the opportunity cost of schooling. It is the four-year forgone wage income for the
college students. The third term is the present value of tuition paid during college, which represents the
direct cost of schooling. From this representation it is very clear how the skill premium is going to a⁄ect
an individual￿ s schooling decision. Keeping other things equal, an increase in the skill premium will raise
the bene￿t of schooling, thus raising NPV . A higher NPV will induce a higher utility gain from schooling
UTILc
t ￿UTILh
t . If we assume that the distribution of disutility cost is stationary, a higher utility gain from
schooling means it is more likely that DIS(i) < [UTILc
t ￿ UTILh
t ], which implies that more people would
like to go to college. This mechanism will generate the co-movement between skill premium and enrollment
rate as observed in the data.
3.5 Production
I close the model by describing the production side of the economy. The representative ￿rm in the economy
uses capital stock (K), skilled labor (S), and unskilled labor (U) to produce a single good. Here skilled labor
consists of college graduates, and unskilled workers are high school graduates. Following KORV (2000), I
adopt an aggregate production function with capital-skill complementarity as follows:9
Yt = AtF(Kt;St;Ut) (9)
= At[￿U￿





where At is the level of total factor productivity (TFP), Bt is the level of capital productivity and represents
capital-embodied technological change, 0 < ￿;￿ < 1, and ￿;￿ < 1. This production technology is of constant
returns to scale. The elasticity of substitution between the capital-skilled labor combination and unskilled
labor is 1
1￿￿ and the one between capital and skilled labor is 1
1￿￿. For the capital-skill complementarity, we
require 1
1￿￿ < 1
1￿￿; which means ￿ < ￿.
The di⁄erence between my production function and the one in KORV (2000) is that I do not distinguish
between structures and equipment, so the capital K in my model is just the total capital stock.
The representative ￿rm rents capital, skilled labor, and unskilled labor from households at the rates rt;
wc
t, and wh
t . Its pro￿t maximization implies the ￿rst-order conditions
rt = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)AtB
￿






t ￿ ￿; (10)
wc











where Ht = [￿U￿







9Griliches (1969) provides evidence from U.S. manufacturing industries data that skill is more complementary with capital
than unskilled labor. Du⁄y et al. (2004) show that there is some empirical support for the capital-skill complementarity
hypothesis by using a macro panel set of 73 countries over the period 1965-1990.

















Log-linearizing (13), di⁄erentiating it with respect to time, and using ￿hat￿to denote the rate of change
( ^ X =
_ X




wh) ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ ￿)(
BK
S
)￿[ ^ B + ^ K ￿ ^ S] + (￿ ￿ 1)[^ S ￿ ^ U]: (14)
This equation is exactly the same as in KORV (2000) except for the B term. It says that the growth rate of
the skill premium is determined by two components. One is the growth rate of the relative supply of skilled
labor [^ S ￿ ^ U]. Since ￿ < 1, relatively faster growth of skilled labor will reduce the skill premium. This term
is called ￿relative quantity e⁄ect￿in KORV (2000). The other term ￿(￿ ￿￿)(BK
S )￿[ ^ B + ^ K ￿ ^ S] is called the
￿capital-skill complementarity e⁄ect￿ . If capital grows faster than skilled labor, this term will raise the skill
premium due to ￿ < ￿. The dynamics of the skill premium depend on the magnitudes of these two e⁄ects.
The law of motion for the capital stock in this economy is expressed as
Kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Kt + Xtqt;
where Xt denotes capital investment. Following GHK (1997), I interpret qt as the current state of the
technology for producing capital, hence changes in q represent the notion of investment-speci￿c technological
change (ISTC). When q increases, investment becomes increasingly e¢ cient over time.
To simplify computation, I follow Fernandez-Villaverde (2001) and map ISTC into the changes in the
capital productivity level Bt:10 Therefore, increases in qt will be transformed into increases in Bt. As shown
in equation (14), when Bt increases, through the capital-skill complementarity e⁄ect, it will raise the skill
premium. ISTC thus is also skill-biased.11
Finally, the resource constraint in the economy is given by
Ct + TUITIONt + Xt = Yt;
where Ct is total consumption and TUITIONt is the total tuition payment.
3.6 The Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
The model above is a standard OLG setting with discrete schooling choices. And I assume that individuals
have perfect foresight about the paths of exogenous changes fntg and fqtg.12 Suppose an individual i born
10The transformation is Bt = 1 + (1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)t￿1)(
qt
q1 ￿ 1): I normalize q1 = 1 in initial steady state. Please refer to
Fernandez-Villaverde (2001) for details.
11More accurately, it can be easily shown that an economy with investment-speci￿c technological change q, but without
capital-embodied technological change B (which is my benchmark economy), can be equivalent to another economy with
capital-embodied technological change B, but without ISTC in terms of allocation. (See GHK (1997) for details.) Since
changes in Bt will increase the skill premium, due to the equivalence the ISTC in my benchmark economy has the same e⁄ect.
12Perfect foresight assumption is quite common in this type of research. McGrattan and Ohanian (2008) use this assumption
and conduct deterministic simulations to study the macroeconomic impact of ￿scal shocks during World War II. Chen et al.
(2006) take the actual time path of TFP growth rate to investigate its impact on post-war Japanese saving rate. Their sensitivity
analysis shows that alternative expectations hypotheses do not change the quantitative results signi￿cantly.
10at time t has already made the schooling decision si;t. Conditional on this choice, I can present her utility
maximization problem in terms of a dynamic programming representation.
For si;t = c, let V c
t+j￿1(aj￿1;t+j￿2;j) denote the value function of an age-j individual with asset holding




fu(cj;t+j￿1) + ￿V c
t+j(aj;t+j￿1;j + 1)g (15)
subject to (4)-(5).




fu(cj;t+j￿1) + ￿V h
t+j(aj;t+j￿1;j + 1)g (16)
subject to (6).
Individuals solve their perfect foresight dynamic problem by using backward induction. Back to age 1,
an individual with disutility index i will choose si;t based on the criterion below
si;t = c if V c
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1) ￿ DIS(i) > V h
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1);
si;t = h if V c
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1) ￿ DIS(i) < V h
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1); (17)
si;t = indi⁄erent if V c
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1) ￿ DIS(i) = V h
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1):
Based on the individuals￿dynamic program and the schooling choice criterion above, the de￿nition of
the competitive equilibrium in this model economy is standard.
De￿nition 1 Let A = fa : ￿b ￿ a ￿ amaxg, S =fh;cg, J = f1;2;::::::Jg, D = [0;1], and T = f1;2;:::;Tg.
Given the age structure ff￿j;tgJ
j=1gT
t=1, a Recursive Competitive Equilibrium is a sequence of individual
value functions V s
t : A￿J ! R; individual consumption decision rules Cs
t : A￿J ! R+; individual saving
decision rules As
t : A ￿ J ! A for s 2 S and t 2 T ; an individual i￿ s period 1 schooling choice s￿
i;t for
s 2 S, i 2 D, and t 2 T ; an allocation of capital and labor (skilled and unskilled) inputs fKt;St;UtgT
t=1 for
the ￿rm; a price system fwc
t;wh
t ;rtgT
t=1; and a sequence of measures of individual distribution over age and
assets ￿
s
t : A ￿ J ! R+ for s 2 S and t 2 T such that:
1. Given prices fwc
t;wh
t ;rtg, the individual decision rules Cs
t and As
t solve the individual dynamic problems
(15) and (16).
2. Optimal schooling choice s￿




t ;rtg are the solutions to the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t maximization problem (10)-(12).
4. The time-variant age-dependent distribution of individuals choosing s follows the law of motion
￿
s






















































t(a;j)tuitionj;t + Xt = Yt; (22)
or
Ct + TUITIONt + Xt = Yt:
When ISTC and demographic change both stabilize at some constant levels, that is, qt = q and nt = n, 8t,
the economy reaches a steady state. In such a steady state, the age structure, the distribution of individuals
over assets and age, and the individual decision rules are all age-dependant but time-invariant. Therefore, I
can de￿ne the stationary competitive equilibrium accordingly.
4 Parameterization
In this section, I calibrate the model economy to replicate certain properties of the U.S. economy in the pre-
1951 initial steady state. More speci￿cally, my strategy is to choose parameter values to match on average
features of the U.S. economy from 1947 to 1951.13
4.1 Data Work of Cohort-Speci￿c Skill Premium
The skill premium data I report in Figure 1 is the average skill premium across all age groups in a speci￿c
year. However, since the model presented here is a cohort-based OLG model, each cohort￿ s college-going
decision is based on this cohort￿ s speci￿c lifetime skill premium pro￿le. For example, for the cohort born at







j=1. In order to understand the mechanism of
schooling decision for each cohort, I need to ￿nd the data counterpart of this cohort-speci￿c skill premium.
I use March CPS data from 1962 to 2003, plus 1950 and 1960 Census data to construct the cohort-
speci￿c skill premium pro￿les for the 1948-1991 cohorts. (I choose to end the sample in 1991 due to the data
quality￿ the 1991 cohort only has 12 year HSG wage and 8 year CG wage data.) In order to make my results
comparable to the literature, I follow Eckstein and NagypÆl (2004) in restricting the data (please refer to
their paper for the details). The sample includes all full-time full-year (FTFY) workers between ages 18
and 65. To be consistent with the model, I only look at high school graduates (HSG) and college graduates
(CG). The wage is the annualized real wage (in terms of 2002 U.S. dollars). In Figure 6, I show the mean
13I choose the U.S. economy from 1947 to 1951 as the initial steady state based on the observations that both the ISTC and
demographic changes were quite stable for this time period.
12CG and HSG wages (top panel) and the skill premium (bottom panel) which is the ratio between these two
means for the sample period 1949-2002. It is similar to the pattern of the skill premium shown in Figure
1, which includes post-college graduates in the skilled labor group. However, the decline during the 1970s
is ￿ atter and the magnitude of the increase since 1980 is smaller. This is because the wage of post-college
graduates increases even faster than CG.14 Including them (as Autor and Katz (1999) do) further widens
the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor.
Since CPS is not a panel data set, theoretically speaking I cannot track speci￿c cohorts from it. However,
since it is a repeated cross-sectional data set, I can use a so-called ￿synthetic cohort construction method￿
to construct a proxy of a cohort￿ s speci￿c skill premium. For example, the 1962 cohort￿ s (18-year-old HSG
in 1962) lifetime (18-65 years old) HSG wage pro￿le fwh
1961+j"h
jg48
j=1 is constructed as follows: I take the
18-year-old HSGs in 1962 and calculate their mean wage. Then I take the 19-year-old HSGs in 1963 and
calculate their mean wage. Next, the 20-year-old HSGs in 1964, the 21-year-old HSGs in 1965, and so on,
up to the 58-year-old HSGs in 2002. Later I will show how to predict the mean HSG wage after age 58 to
complete the lifecycle wage pro￿le for this cohort.
I perform a similar procedure to construct the 1962 cohort￿ s CG wage pro￿le fwc
1961+j"c
jg48
j=1. But I start
from 1966 because if someone from the 1962 cohort chose to go to college, she would spend four years in
college, graduate in 1966, and start to earn CG wages thereafter. Therefore, I take the 22-year-old CGs in
1966, calculate their mean wage, and then follow the above procedure again.
Using this method repeatedly for each birth cohort, I have the original data sequences of cohort-speci￿c
HSG and CG lifetime wage pro￿les for the 1948-1991 cohorts. However, due to the time range of the CPS
data, some data points are missing for a complete lifetime pro￿le for every cohort. For example, some
cohorts are missing at the late age data points (cohorts after 1962) and some are missing at the early age
data points (e.g., cohorts 1948-1961). I use econometric method to predict the mean wage at those speci￿c
age points and interpolate the missing data. I predict them by either second- or third- order polynomials,


















c + "c; experiencec=age-22.
The criterion is basically the goodness of ￿t. I check with the neighborhood cohorts to make sure the
predicted value is reasonable. The ￿rule of thumb￿of a hump-shaped pro￿le also applies here to help make
choices. As an example, in Figures 7 and 8 I show the prediction for the 1955 cohort by using the trendlines
of second- and third- order polynomials. Obviously, the third-order one ￿ts the data better, therefore, I use
it to predict the missing data points for this cohort.
4.2 Distribution of Disutility Cost
The distribution of disutility cost DIS(i) becomes very crucial in the computation because it is this distri-
bution that determines the enrollment rate and hence the relative supply of skilled labor in the model. The
problem is how to obtain it.
14Eckstein and NagypÆl (2004) document this fact. Please refer to their paper for more details.
13The schooling choice criterion embodied in (17) actually sheds some light on how to compute the dis-
tribution of disutility cost. Note that the person i￿ who is indi⁄erent between going to college or not will
have
V c
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1) ￿ DIS(i￿) = V h
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1);
that is, her disutility cost is exactly the di⁄erence between two conditional value functions. Since disutility
cost is a decreasing function of index i, people with disutility index i > i￿ will go to college. Therefore,
for a speci￿c cohort t, if we calculate the di⁄erence between two conditional value functions V c
t (a0;t￿1 =
0;1)￿V h
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1), we obtain the cut-o⁄ disutility cost for this cohort. If we also know the enrollment
rate of this cohort, it tells us the proportion of people in this cohort who have less disutility than i￿ at that
speci￿c cut-o⁄ point of disutility cost. In this way, I can pin down one point on the CDF of disutility cost.
Applying this procedure to di⁄erent cohorts will give me a picture of how disutility cost is distributed.15
Fortunately, I have cohort-speci￿c lifetime wage pro￿le data from 1948 to 1991 as described in Section
4.1. I set the interest rate equal 3%, the discount parameter ￿ to 1:03, and the preference parameter
￿ to 1:5.16 For each cohort born at time t, I normalize the 18-year-old HSG wage (which is wh
t "h
1 in
the model) to one and feed in the cohort-speci￿c lifetime wage pro￿les from the data. I go through the
backward induction of the Bellman equation as described in Section 3.6 to obtain the value function di⁄erence
V c
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1)￿V h
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1) for every cohort t. In Figure 9, by plotting them against enrollment rate
data in the same time range, I have 44 points on the possible CDF of the disutility cost. By assuming disutility
costs follow a normal distribution, I then estimate the CDF function.17 Later in the computation of the
stationary equilibrium and transition path, during each iteration when I obtain factor prices fwc
t;wh
t ;rtg; I
can conduct backward induction of Bellman equations loop to obtain the conditional value functions. Feeding
the di⁄erence between these two functions into the estimated CDF, I get the corresponding enrollment rate.
4.3 Demographic
The model period is one year. Agents enter the model at age 18 (j = 1), work up to age 65 (J = 48), and
die thereafter.
The growth rate of cohort size n is calculated as the average growth rate of the HSG cohort size from
1948 to 1951, which is 0%.
4.4 Preferences and Endowments
I pick CRRA coe¢ cient ￿ = 1:5, which is in the reasonable range between 1 and 5 and is widely used in the
literature (e.g., Gourinchas and Parker (2002)).
15Here I assume the distribution of disutility cost is stationary.
16Since I obtain the disutility cost from the partial equilibrium computation given the preference parameter ￿, the discount
rate ￿, and the interest rate r, later when I calibrate the model to match pre-1951 steady state, I need to make sure these three
values are consistent with those used in the general equilibrium. The values I give here are consistent with those I obtain later
in calibrating the initial steady state.
17Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) also assume the ￿nonpecuniary bene￿t of attending college￿is normally distributed.
A more ￿exible Beta distribution yields a very similar estimated CDF as normal distribution within the reasonable range of
disutility cost.
14Parameter Description Value and Source
J maximum life span 48, corresponding to age 65 in real life
f"s
jgJ
j=1;s = c;h age e¢ ciency pro￿les 1962-2003 CPS, and 1950, 1960 Census
￿ CRRA coe¢ cient 1.5, Gourinchas and Parker (2002)
￿ elasticity b/w U and K 0.401, KORV (2000)
￿ elasticity b/w S and K -0.495, KORV (2000)
￿ depreciation rate 0.069, • Imrohoro… glu, • Imrohoro… glu, and Joines (1999)
Table 2: Parameter Values from Outside Sources
The age e¢ ciency pro￿le of high school graduates f"h
jgJ
j=1 and college graduates f"c
jgJ
j=1 are calculated
as follows: from the 1962-2003 CPS and the 1950 and 1960 Census data I calculate the mean HSG and CG
wages across all ages for the time period 1949-2002, then I obtain the mean HSG and CG wages in the same










The result is shown in Figure 10. Both pro￿les exhibit a clear hump shape and reach a peak around age 55.
Also notice that "c
j = 0;8j = 1;:::;4, since I assume CGs never work during study.
4.5 Technology
Two key elasticity parameters in the production function, the coe¢ cient for elasticity of substitution between
capital and skilled labor ￿ = ￿0:495 and the coe¢ cient for elasticity of substitution between unskilled labor
and the capital-skilled labor combination ￿ = 0:401, are taken directly from KORV (2000). This implies the
elasticity of substitution between capital and skilled labor is 0:67 and the one between unskilled and skilled
labor is 1:67. Capital-skill complementarity is satis￿ed.
In the initial steady state, both TFP level A and capital productivity B are normalized to unity. I set
the depreciation rate of capital ￿ to 0:069 by following • Imrohoro… glu, • Imrohoro… glu, and Joines (1999), who
calculate this parameter from the annual U.S. data since 1954.
Table 2 summarizes the choices of parameter values from outside sources.
This leaves four parameter values to be calibrated. The subjective discount rate ￿ is set equal to 1.03 to
replicate the target capital-output ratio 2.67, which is the average value from 1947 to 1951.18 The income
share of capital in the capital-skilled labor combination ￿ = 0:645 is chosen to match the income share of
capital in NIPA for the 1947-1951 period. The income share of unskilled labor ￿ = 0:418 is chosen to match
the average skill premium in the 1949 Census data (1:4556). The scale factor of the disutility cost sd (see
Appendix B for detail) is chosen to match the average enrollment rate between 1947 and 1951. Table 3
summarizes the discussion above.
The computation method of the steady state is described in detail in Appendix B.
18It is plausible for a subjective discount factor greater than one in an overlapping generations setting. See • Imrohoro… glu et
al. (1995) for a detailed discussion.
15Parameter Value Match the moment
￿ 1.03 K
Y = 2:67
￿ 0.645 Capital income share= 27:57%
￿ 0.418 Skill premium= 1:4556
sd 3.10 enrollment rate= 41:54%




wh 1.4541 (construction) 1.4556 (1949 Census data)
e 41.51% (construction) 41.54% (1947-51 average)
K=Y 2.77 (construction) 2.67 (1947-51 average)
(whU + wcS)=Y 72.47% (construction) 72.43% (1947-51 average)
S=U 67.67% 66.28% (1949 Census data)
C=Y 80.33% 79.57% (1947-51 average)




Table 4: Macro Aggregates in the Benchmark Economy: Initial Steady State
5 Steady State Results
In this section, I report the numerical simulations for the stationary equilibrium of the benchmark economy
and compare the results with the pre-1951 U.S. data. The macro aggregates that the model generates are
shown in Table 4.
The simulations show that the model does well in matching the data. It matches our targets￿ skill
premium, enrollment rate, capital-output ratio (K=Y ), and labor income-output ratio (w
cS+w
hU
Y ) by con-
struction. Additionally, several key macro aggregate ratios such as consumption-output ratio (C=Y ) and
investment-output ratio (X=Y ) are also in line with the U.S. average data. The model also matches the
relative supply of skilled labor very well. The risk-free real interest rate is 3%. Average CG enjoys higher
lifetime utility than average HSG because a CG has higher consumption over the lifecycle. We can see this
clearly in the lifecycle pro￿les below.
5.1 Lifecycle Pro￿les
This model also generates the lifecycle pro￿les for CG and HSG, respectively. Figure 11 shows the lifecycle
pro￿les of wealth accumulation, consumption, and income for CG and HSG. Panel A shows that since CGs
have no income in the ￿rst four periods, they have to borrow to pay for tuition and consumption. Therefore,
they accumulate negative wealth over the ￿rst four periods. After graduating from college, they start to
earn the CG wage and are able to pay the loans. By age 34, CGs pay back all the loans borrowed from
16n (%) wc=wh S=U (%) BK=S UTILc UTILh
0 (benchmark) 1.4541 67.67 5.72 -100.2 -157.2
4.06 1.5085 61.54 5.43 -100.9 -156.8
-1.57 1.4400 69.55 5.83 -100.0 -157.1
Table 5: E⁄ect of Population Growth on Steady State
previous years and begin to accumulate positive wealth, reaching a peak around their mid-50s. At that
time they begin to dissave. There is no bequest motive in this model, therefore people die with zero assets
remaining. The same hump shape is also observed for HSG, except that they accumulate positive assets
from the beginning.
The lifecycle pro￿le of consumption in Panel B is worthy of explanation. It keeps increasing until the





)￿ = ￿(1 + r): (23)
Given ￿ = 1:03 and r = 0:03 as in the results, ￿(1 + r) = 1:061. Therefore, the right-hand side of equation
(23) is larger than one, inducing a positive growth rate of consumption over the life cycle.
Although CGs do not have any income during the ￿rst four periods, they have higher consumption than
HSGs at any age. This is because in this deterministic model, the consumption path is determined by
permanent income, and CGs have higher discounted lifetime income.
Finally, panel C shows the hump-shaped lifetime labor income pro￿les for CG and HSG, which are





5.2 Comparative Static Experiments
Based on the steady state results, I carry out some comparative static exercises to study the e⁄ects of
the growth rate of cohort size by changing n and the e⁄ects of investment-speci￿c technological change by
changing q. I summarize the corresponding results in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. In Table 5, 0% is the
average growth rate of the HSG cohort size from 1947 to 1951, which is our benchmark case, 4.06% is the
average growth rate of the HSG cohort size from 1952 to 1976, the ￿baby boom￿period, and -1.57% is the
average growth rate from 1977 to 1991, the period when nt continuously decreased. The results show that
as the growth rate of the HSG cohort size increases, the skill premium also increases, and vice versa.
Why does the increase in the HSG cohort size cause an increase in the skill premium? The intuition is
as follows: an increase in n will change the age structure f￿jgJ
j=1 in the economy, making it skew towards
younger cohorts. Keeping the enrollment rate unchanged, more people from the college-aged cohort stay in
college. Meanwhile, more people from the college-aged cohort also join the labor force as unskilled labor.
This results in relatively less out-of-school skilled labor in the current labor market, as is shown in Table 5.
When n increases to around 4%, the relative supply of skilled labor S=U decreases by 9.1%. This change
tends to raise the relative price of skilled labor, which is the skill premium, through the relative quantity
e⁄ect. However, a change in age structure also has an impact on asset accumulation. Recall that the
lifecycle pro￿le of asset holdings for CG and HSG in Figure 11. People accumulate fewer assets during early
17B wc=wh S=U (%) BK=S UTILc UTILh
1 (benchmark) 1.4541 67.67 5.72 -100.2 -157.2
3.28 (2000 level) 1.8516 86.00 18.61 -88.8 -125.3
Table 6: E⁄ect of Investment-Speci￿c Technological Change on Steady State
working years. A shift towards younger cohorts in the demographic structure thus decreases the incentive
of asset accumulation in the economy. As a result, the capital-output ratio (K=Y ) decreases from 2.77 in
the benchmark case to 2.57 in the n = 4:06% case. It also leads to a decrease in e⁄ective capital-skilled
labor ratio (BK=S). Then, through the capital-skill complementarity e⁄ect, it tends to decrease the skill
premium. Quantitatively, the impact of the demographic change on the relative supply of skilled labor
dominates that on the relative demand of skilled labor through capital-skill complementarity. Thus, the skill
premium increases. On the other hand, a decrease in n will make the age structure favor the older cohort,
and hence will increase the relative supply of skilled labor and raise the incentive for asset accumulation,
These two impacts again tend to o⁄set each other. Quantitatively, a change in n from 0% to -1.57% only
slightly decreases the skill premium.
Next, I show the e⁄ect of a permanent change in q on the steady state. Consistent with GHK(1997)
and KORV(2000), in this model, due to the existence of ISTC the relative price of capital goods is equal
to the inverse of the investment-speci￿c technological change q. Therefore, I can use the relative price of
capital to identify ISTC q. I take the price index of personal consumption expenditures from NIPA, and
the quality-adjusted price index of total investment (equipment and structures) from Cummins and Violante
(2002) for the time period 1951-2000. I then divide these two sequences to obtain the data counterpart of q.
Figure 12 shows the log of the time series of qt. It was fairly stable before 1957, then started to grow. The
average growth rate of q in the 1960s and 1970s was 1.8% and 1.7%, respectively. It has speeded up since
the early 1980s. The average growth rate in the 1980s was 3.2% and it was even higher in the 1990s (4.4%).
Finally, I use the mapping mentioned before to transform the sequence of qt to the changes in the capital
productivity level Bt: Normalizing the initial steady state value B1951 to one, I have B2000 = 3:28. During
these 50 years, the decline in the relative price of the capital goods is equivalent to an increase in capital
productivity by approximately 3.3 times.
Suppose that the U.S. economy reaches the steady state again after 2000. Keeping other things equal,
Table 6 shows the e⁄ects of this permanent change from B1951 to B2000.
Investment-speci￿c technological change, through capital-skill complementarity, increases the skill pre-
mium signi￿cantly. The mechanism is as follows: investment-speci￿c technological change raises capital
productivity Bt, and hence raises the e⁄ective capital stock, BtKt. Since capital is complementary with
skilled labor, increases in e⁄ective capital also raise the demand for skilled labor. Therefore, it tends to in-
crease the skill premium. However, rising skill premium gives individuals stronger incentive to go to college.
The relative supply of skilled labor also increases. The relative quantity e⁄ect thus dampens the increase in
the skill premium. The quantitative results in Table 6 con￿rm that the ￿rst-order impact of ISTC is on the
demand side of skilled labor through capital-skill complementarity. This impact dominates the repercussion
e⁄ect from the relative supply side. Hence, the skill premium increases from 1.4541 to 1.8516 in the model,
which is quite close to 1.8357 in the data. The results also show that both CG and HSG signi￿cantly bene￿t
18from this technological change.
6 Transition Path
The comparative static exercises above (especially the one with ISTC) show that we are on the right track
in explaining the increases in the skill premium over time. However, to see how far the model can go to
match the time series data of the skill premium in the postwar U.S. economy, comparative static analysis is
not enough. One has to solve the model along a time path.
Following the spirit of the computation method in Chen, • Imrohoro… glu, and • Imrohoro… glu (2006) and
Conesa and Kreuger (1999), I compute the model along a transition path from initial pre-1951 steady state
towards a ￿nal steady state in the far future. The computation algorithm is described in detail in Appendix
C.
6.1 Benchmark Case
In the benchmark case, I feed into the model the exogenous path of capital-speci￿c technological change
fBtg2000
t=1951 and demographic change embodied in the change in the growth rate of the HSG cohort size
fntg2000
t=1951. I also feed in the normalized tuition payments ftuitiontg2000
t=1951: I then assume that capital-
speci￿c technological change gradually decelerates until it becomes stable in 2030, and it continues at this
constant level until 2050. For simplicity, I also assume that after 2000 there is no demographic change and
the tuition payment is constant at the 2000 level. Since I want to focus on the e⁄ect of ISTC, the neutral
TFP change has been normalized to unity for all time periods through the transition.19 I compute the
transition path of the benchmark economy between 1951 and 2050 and truncate it to the 1951-2000 period.
The results are shown in Figure 13.
In Figure 13, the simulated skill premium from the benchmark economy overshoots the actual data since
1965, but it captures the increase after 1980 very well. From 1951 to 2000, the data show that the skill
premium increases from 1.4546 to 1.8357 and the average growth rate (per year) during these 50 years is
0.49%. In the model the skill premium increases from 1.4543 to 1.8793 and the average growth rate is
0.54%. Focusing on 1951 to 1959, the average growth rate of the skill premium in the data is 0.73%, while
in the model it is -0.32%. The model does not capture the increase through that decade. From 1963, I have
annual data for the skill premium so the comparison between the data and the model￿ s performance is more
accurate. From 1963 to 1969, the average growth rate is 1.30% in the data and 1.52% in the model. From
1969 to 1981, the skill premium decreases at the average rate of 0.45%, but the model misses this decline
by predicting an almost ￿ at skill premium over this period, The average growth rate is 0.02%. The skill
premium starts to increase dramatically beginning in 1981. From 1981 to 1990, the average growth rate in
the data is 1.45%, while the model predicts 0.82%. That is, the model captures 56% of the change in the
skill premium during this decade. From 1990 to 2000, the average growth rate in the data slows down to
0.96%, whereas the model predicts 1.01%, which overshoots the actual growth rate. Overall, for the three
episodes in the ￿N￿shape of the skill premium from 1963 to 2000, the model captures 117% of the changes
19See Section 6.3 for the sensitivity analysis when the variable neutral TFP change is allowed.
19in the skill premium for the period 1963-1969 and 77% for the period 1981-2000. But the model fails to
replicate the declining part of the skill premium from 1969 to 1981.2021
6.2 Counterfactual Decomposition
To answer the quantitative question raised in the introduction, I conduct the following counterfactual ex-
periments to isolate each exogenous change and investigate its impact on the skill premium.
I ￿rst shut down the investment-speci￿c technological change, so the only exogenous force remaining is
the demographic change. The results are shown in Figure 14.
Figure 14 shows that the model ￿ts the skill premium data fairly well until 1980, and it generates the
declining part of the skill premium during the 1970s. However, it cannot capture the dramatic increase since
1980 as shown in the data. More speci￿cally, from 1963 to 1969, the model generates around 1% average
growth rate in the skill premium, which can explain 77% of the change in this period. From 1969 to 1981,
the data shows that the skill premium decreases on average at a rate of 0.45%, while the model generates an
average growth rate of -0.14%. The model captures 31% of the decline in the skill premium for that period.
However, from 1981, the model predicts a slight decrease in the skill premium (-0.007% per year), in contrast
to the dramatic increase shown in the data.22
Next, I shut down the demographic change. What remains is only the investment-speci￿c technological
change. Figure 15 shows that the results are similar to those in the benchmark case. The skill premium
overshoots the data after the early 1970s and keeps increasing afterwards. Therefore, it captures the dramatic
increase since the late 1970s, but misses the declining part of the skill premium during the 1970s. From 1963
to 1969, the average growth rate of the skill premium in the model is 0.55%. The model can thus explain
about 42% of the change in the skill premium over this period. From 1969 to 1981, the data show that the
skill premium decreases at an average rate of 0.45%, while the model goes the wrong direction to predict
a growth at a rate of 0.26% on average. However, after 1981, the ￿ISTC only￿model generates a 0.89%
20The model also raises the enrollment rate from 41.52% to 48.07% for the period 1951-2000; while the enrollment rate in
the data is from 41.54% to 63.3%. In other words, the model can explain about 30% of the increase in the enrollment rate
during this period. Matching the college enrollment rate is not the target of this paper. The model here is a highly abstract one
that excludes many of the important determinants of an individual￿ s schooling choice such as policy change (e.g., GI Bill and
Vietnam War Draft) and the shifts in social norm that have a⁄ected especially the female college-going behavior and increased
female enrollment
(see Goldin (2006)). As emphasized in the introduction, endogenous schooling choice is needed here to capture the dynamic
interaction between the skill premium and relative supply of skilled labor. We thus can investigate better the general equilibrium
e⁄ects of two exogenous changes on the skill premium. To understand why enrollment rate has changed over time is a deeper
goal and it is beyond the scope of this paper.
21Speaking about the model performance on other dimensions of macro variables, the benchmark case predicts a rising rate
of return to capital from the 1950s to mid-1980s and a declining rate since then. This trend is quite similar to the historical
trend of nominal interest rate in the U.S.. The average rate of return in the model is around 4.2% over the period 1951-2000.
The model also does a fairly ok job in tracking the U.S. investment-output share along the transition path. Model generates
an average investment share of 20.74% from 1951 to 2000, while the U.S. data are 20.09%. For the sake of brevity, I do not
present the results here. The ￿gures are available upon the request.
22When ISTC is shut down, the model generates little variation in the enrollment rate. From 1951 to 2000, the model predicts
that the enrollment rate slightly decreases from 41.52% to 40.88%, while the data re￿ect an increase from 41.54% to 63.33%.
The average growth rate of the enrollment rate is 0.95% in the data, while in the model it is -0.03%. Hence, demographic
change does not have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the enrollment rate over this period.
20Period Data (%) Benchmark (%) Demographic (%) ISTC (%)
1963-2000 0.68 0.73 0.11 0.63
1963-1969 1.30 1.52 1.00 0.55
1969-1981 -0.45 0.02 -0.14 0.26
1981-1990 1.45 0.82 0.06 0.78
1990-2000 0.96 1.01 -0.07 0.98
Table 7: Average Annual Growth Rate of the Skill Premium: Model vs. Data
average growth rate in the skill premium over the period 1981-2000, which can explain about 74% of the
increase in the skill premium in the data.23
The decomposition results become more clear when we combine three cases discussed above in one graph.
In Figure 16, I show the simulations of the skill premium in the benchmark case, in the ￿Demographic only￿
case, and in the ￿ISTC only￿case. We can see that the ￿Demographic only￿outcome is very close to the
benchmark outcome until 1965; then these cases diverge. On the other hand, the ￿ISTC only￿outcome closely
follows the benchmark outcome since the late 1970s. From this observation, we can draw the conclusion that
demographic change dwarfs ISTC before 1966, and it contributes to the decline in the skill premium in the
1970s. However, things reverse after the late 1970s, when ISTC takes over to drive the increase in the skill
premium.
Table 7 compares the average annual growth rate of the skill premium in the data and in the three model
cases for di⁄erent periods.
The contribution of each force to the dynamics of the skill premium is summarized in Table 8. Here the
contribution is measured by the ratio of the average annual growth rate of the skill premium in the model
and in the data.24 Overall, ISTC is much important than demographic change in explaining the pattern of
the skill premium from 1963 to 2000 (93% vs. 17%). But demographic change dwarfs ISTC in the 1960s
(77% vs. 42%). It can also explain about one-third of the declining for the period 1969-1981 while ISTC
goes in the wrong direction. The relative importance of demographic change decreases dramatically since
1981, while ISTC becomes the major driving force behind the skill premium.
Since the e⁄ective capital-skilled labor ratio (BK=S) and relative supply of skilled labor (S=U) are the
two major determinants of the skill premium in the model, I also present simulations of both ratios in Figures
17 and 18, respectively. Figure 17 shows the benchmark BK=S ratio closely tracks the ￿Demographic only￿
BK=S from 1951 to 1965, which implies that demographic change dominates ISTC over this period. The
ups and downs from 1959 to 1965 are due to the dramatic demographic change during that time. From
23In this case, the model predicts that the enrollment rate rises from 41.52% in 1951 to 48.07% in 2000, the same as in the
benchmark case.
24We should also be aware of that these two exogenous forces are not mutually exclusive. This explains why the summation
of each contribution that takes separately is not equal to the contribution in the benchmark case. For example, in 1981-1990
period, the contribution of demographic change is 4% and that of ISTC is 54%. We should expect the total e⁄ect of combining
the two forces together, as in the benchmark case, to be 58% if the e⁄ects on the skill premium from these two forces are
orthogonal, but the actual number is 56%. The reason lies in the interaction between these two forces (refer to Section 5.2 for
a discussion). Both forces contribute to the dynamics of the capital-skilled labor ratio (BK=S) and relative supply of skilled
labor (S=U). And the skill premium is nonlinearly determined by these two ratios.
21Period Data (%) Benchmark (%) Demographic (%) ISTC (%)
1963-2000 100 107 17 93
1963-1969 100 117 77 42
1969-1981 100 -5 31 -57
1981-1990 100 56 4 54
1990-2000 100 106 -7 103
Table 8: Decomposition of the Contribution to the Dynamics of the Skill Premium
1959 to 1960, nt drops from 14.2% to 5.7%. This decrease in the growth rate of HSGs￿cohort size lead
to an increase in BK=S (recall the mechanism for the ￿baby bust￿in Section 5.2). On the other hand, nt
increases from 1.3% in 1962 to 17.5% in 1963. This huge increase changes the age structure signi￿cantly and
decreases the asset accumulation in the economy. Therefore, BK=S decreases drastically. Since 1965, the
benchmark BK=S closely follows the one in the ￿ISTC only￿case. This suggests that ISTC becomes the
major driving force to a⁄ect this ratio. And it is the drastic rise in the capital-skilled labor ratio since the
late 1970s, through capital-skill complementarity, that drives the rising skill premium.
Figure 18 shows the relative supply of skilled labor in the benchmark and two decomposition cases. The
￿Demographic only￿case predicts decreasing S=U from 1951 to 1976 and increasing S=U since then. This is
consistent with the mechanism mentioned in Section 5.2: the ￿baby boom￿decreases S=U, while the ￿baby
bust￿ does the opposite. In contrast, the ￿ISTC only￿ model shows a continuously rising S=U ratio by
generating an increase in the enrollment rate over time. S=U in the benchmark case is in between these two
decomposition cases, as it decreases until 1966, then begins to increase and converges to the ratio in ￿ISTC
only￿model after 1990. This ￿J￿pattern con￿rms that demographic change is a dominating force in driving
the evolution of the relative supply of skilled labor before 1966, but the e⁄ect phases out after that. ISTC
catches up to become the major driving force.
6.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection, I show that the paper￿ s results are robust to the choice of the model setting, alternative
values of key parameters, including neutral technological change, increase in life expentancy, and the time
of the ￿nal steady state.
6.3.1 Retirement and Social Security
First, the current model does not include retirement. However, a speci￿cation including retirement and
social security yields very similar results. In benchmark economy, the skill premium increases from 1.4543
in 1951 to 1.8793 in 2000. While in an extension with life span of 82 periods (people retire at age 66 and
live up to age 100) and a pay-as-your-go social security system (repalcement ratio is 50%), the skill premium
increases from 1.4546 to 1.8726 for the same period.
226.3.2 Elasticity of substitution
Next, since the two elasticity parameters in the production function, ￿ and ￿, are the key parameters in
the model, I verify the sensitivity of the analysis to di⁄erent values of these two parameters. Speci￿cally, I
use the values ￿ = 0:33 and ￿ = ￿0:67, which are taken from Fernandez-Villaverde (2001) since we share
the same speci￿cation of the production function. This implies that the elasticity of substitution between
capital and skilled labor is 0:60, and the one between unskilled and skilled labor is 1:49. I then recalibrate
the model according to these new values. All the comparative static and transition path results are similar
to the benchmark results shown here. For example, the skill premium increases from 1.4558 to 1.8233 for
1951-2000 period.
6.3.3 Neutral TFP Change
So far the model keeps the total factor productivity at a constant level and hence excludes the neutral
technological change. Since the TFP change does not enter into equation (14) that determines the dynamics
of the skill premium, we should not expect that including TFP growth would change the results signi￿cantly.
As a robustness check, I carry on an experiment which allows TFP grows at a rate of 0.15% along the
transition path. Including neutral TFP change slightly increases the skill premium. From 1951 to 2000, the
skill premium increases from 1.4550 to 1.9124. While in the benchmark model, it increases from 1.4553 to
1.8793.
6.3.4 Increasing Life Expectancy
Demographic changes were not only happening in terms of ￿ uctuations in the fertility rates. In 1950 life
expectancy at birth in the US was only 68.2 years. It was at 77 years in 2000. To take into account the
e⁄ects of this demographic dimension, I do the following experiment. In an extended model with retirement
and social security (people retire at age 66 and live up to age 100), I ￿rst use the survival probability taken
from US Life Table for 1949-1951 period to calibrate the model. It predicts that the skill premium in the
initial steady state is 1.4562. I then keep all the other parameters unchanged except that now the survival
probability is replaced by the data taken from US Life Table for 1999-2001 period. Although the survival
probability has been increased substantially for these 50 years, which leads to the increase in life expentancy,
the model predicts that the skill premium only changes slightly to 1.4218. This experiment implies that
increasing life expectancy would not change our results signi￿cantly.
6.3.5 Timing of the Final Steady State
Finally, I test the robustness of the model to the timing of the ￿nal steady state. In the current model, I
set it in an arbitrary way so that the economy reaches the ￿nal steady state after 2050. However, the choice
of this timing does not a⁄ect the results signi￿cantly. For example, if the model reaches the ￿nal steady
state right after 2000, I still obtain almost identical results as in the benchmark model. The skill premium
increases from 1.4544 to 1.8854 for 1951-2000 period.
Figure 19 summarizes the simulated transition path for the skill premium in the di⁄erent experiments
mentioned above.
237 Conclusion
The skill premium (college wage premium) in the U.S. increased in the 1950s and 1960s, decreased in the
1970s, and has increased dramatically since 1980. What are the driving forces behind this ￿N￿shape? The
previous literature proposes several explanations including skill-biased technological change (SBTC) and
demographic change. However, little attention has been paid to investigate the relative importance of each
driving force on the evolution of the skill premium. In this paper, I establish and compute an overlapping
generations general equilibrium model with endogenous schooling choice to answer an important quantitative
question: what percentage of the change in the skill premium for the post-war period in the U.S. can be
explained by demographic change and investment-speci￿c technological change (ISTC), respectively?
In this model, ISTC and demographic change drive the equilibrium outcomes of the skill premium by
dynamically a⁄ecting the relative demand and supply of skilled labor. ISTC, through the key feature of
capital-skill complementarity in the production technology, increases the relative demand of skilled labor,
and thus raises the skill premium. In turn, the rising skill premium encourages skill formation and increases
the relative supply of skilled labor. In contrast, demographic change a⁄ects the age structure in the economy.
A change in the age structure has a direct impact on the relative supply of skilled labor. In addition, since
people have di⁄erent saving tendencies along the life cycle, a change in the age structure also in￿ uences the
relative demand of skilled labor through changing asset accumulation in the economy. The ultimate e⁄ects
of these two forces on the skill premium depend on the quantitative magnitude of both demand and supply
e⁄ects.
I calibrate the model to match U.S. data for the period 1947-1951 as the initial steady state. Then, by
feeding in the ISTC data from Cummins and Violante (2002) and the growth rate of the HSG cohort size
from 1951 to 2000, I conduct perfect foresight deterministic simulations to compare with the data of the
1951-2000 period and counterfactual decomposition experiments to identify the e⁄ects of each force.
The results show that demographic change dwarfs ISTC before the late 1960s and accounts for about
one-third of the decline in the skill premium in the 1970s. However, ISTC takes over to drive the dramatic
increase in the skill premium since the early 1980s, explaining about three-fourth of the increase in the skill
premium since 1981.
By carefully conducting this calibration exercise, the current paper helps to narrow down the explanations
of rising skill premium. In a more comprehensive dynamic general equilibrium framework, this paper con￿rms
KORV￿ s (2000) main ￿nding on quantitative importance of capital-skill complementarity in a⁄ecting the
skill premium in the post-war period. Goldin and Katz (2007) claim that the slowdown in the growth of the
relative supply of college workers starting around 1980 was a major reason for the rising skill premium from
1980 to 2005. Education has been lost to technology in the race. This paper shows that the race has been
lost is mostly due to the speedup of the technology rather than the slowdown of the supply.
A possible direction to extend the current study is to relax the assumption of perfect substitution across
age groups in skilled and unskilled labor. Card and Lemieux (2001) show that virtually the entire rise in the
skill premium is attributable to the changes in the relative earnings of younger college-educated workers.
And they claim that shifts in cohort-speci￿c supplies of college-educated workers play a very important role.
It would be interesting to see once we allow imperfect substitution between similarly educated workers in
di⁄erent age groups, can the model replicate the above fact and improve its performance.
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268 Appendix A. Data
The skill premium and relative supply of skilled labor data in Figure 1 are taken from Katz and Autor (1999).
The data come from the 1940, 1950, 1960 Censuses and the 1964-1997 March CPS. The skill premium in
their paper is the coe¢ cient on workers with a college degree or above relative to high school graduates in
a log weekly wage regression. The sample includes full-time full-year workers aged between 18 and 65. The
relative supply of skilled labor is the ratio between college equivalents and non-college equivalents, using
weeks worked as weights. Here, college equivalents=CG+0.5￿workers with some college, and non-college
equivalents=High School Dropout+HSG+0.5￿workers with some college. Figure 1 is also the same as Figure
1 in Acemoglu (2003). Please refer to Katz and Autor (1999) or Data Appendix in Acemoglu (2003) for
detailed data construction.
HSG cohort size data in Figure 2 are from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES): Digest
of Education Statistics (DES) 2002, Table 103. Data for 1941, 1943, and 1945 come from DES 1970 Table
66. In this ￿gure ￿year￿refers to school year, for example, 1939 refers to the school year 1939-1940.
The 18-21 year-old population data in Figure 3 come from di⁄erent sources. 1970-2000 data are from
NCES: DES 2002, Table 15. 1960-1969 data are from NCES: DES 1995. 1955-1959 data are from Standard
Education Almanac 1968, Table 1. The 17-year-old population data are from NCES: DES 2002, Table 103.
College enrollment rates of HSG for 1960-2001 in Figure 4 are from NCES: DES 2002, Table 183. 1948-
1959 data are calculated by the author. To construct them, ￿rst I take the 1948-1965 data of ￿rst-time
freshmen enrolled in institutions of higher education (from NCES: DES 1967, Table 86), divided by the
HSG cohort size as in Figure 2. Since ￿rst-time freshmen are not necessarily from recent HSG, I use the
overlapped years 1960-1965 to calculate the average di⁄erence between my calculation and the true data,
then adjust my calculation for the 1948-1959 period according to this di⁄erence.
Average TFRB charges data in Figure 5 are constructed as follows. First, I obtain data about estimated
Average Charges to Full-Time Resident Degree-Credit Undergraduate Students between 1956-57 and 1966-67
from Standard Education Almanac 1969, Table 120; 1967-68 to 1973-74 from Standard Education Almanac
1981-82, P. 231-232; 1974-75 to 1983-84 data from Standard Education Almanac 1984-85, P. 328-329; 1984-85
to 2003-04 data from ￿The Trends in College Pricing 2003￿ , the College Board, Tables 5a, 5b. 1948-1955 data
are from Standard Education Almanac 1968, Table 102: ￿Estimated Costs of Attending College, Per Student:
1931-1981￿ . To make it consistent with the data after 1955, I use the overlapped 1956 data to adjust. Second,
I focus only on public or private four-year institutions. I obtain the TFRB charges for those institutions.
Third, I calculate the enrollment share of public and private four-year institutions. For the 1948-1964 data,
I obtain the total fall enrollment in degree-granting institutions by control of institution (private vs. public)
from NCES: DES 2002 Table 172, noticing that applies to all higher education institutions. Then, from
Table 173, I have total fall enrollment in degree-granting institutions by control and type of institution from
1965 to 2000. Fourth, I weight the average TFRB charges of public and private four-year institutions by
enrollment share, then use the Personal Consumption Expenditure de￿ ator from NIPA to convert them into
constant 2002 dollars. Finally, the third-order moving average method is used to smooth the data.
The construction of the cohort-speci￿c skill premium data is in the text. (See Section 4.1.)
The skill premium used in this paper is the ratio of the real mean annualized wage of CG and HSG as in
Figure 6. The data counterpart of the relative supply of skilled labor (S=U) is the ratio of weeks worked of
27CG plus some college and HSG. I obtain these data from Katz and Autor￿ s (1999) data set.
9 Appendix B. Algorithm to Compute the Stationary Equilibrium
Given the parameter values as shown in the text, I compute the stationary equilibrium as follows:
1. Guess the initial values for capital stock K0 and initial enrollment rate e0:







h(a;j)=1-enrollment rate, so by equation (20) and (21)
I have










Given all the inputs, from the ￿rm￿ s FOCs (10)-(12), I can compute the interest rate r and wage rates
wc and wh.
3. Discretize the asset level ￿b ￿ a ￿ amax (make sure that the borrowing limit b and the maximum asset
amax will never be reached). Given prices fwc;wh;rg, feed in the normalized tuition data. By using
backward induction (remember that aJ = 0), I can solve the conditional value function V s(a;1) for
s = h;c, and therefore obtain the cut-o⁄ disutility cost DIS(i￿) = (V c(a = 0;1) ￿ V h(a = 0;1))=sd,
where sd is the scale factor of disutility cost, which is calibrated to replicate the enrollment rate data.
4. From the estimated CDF function of disutility cost in Figure 9, corresponding to DIS(i￿), obtain the
new enrollment rate e1. Check the convergence criterion (
je0￿e1j
e0 ￿ tole). If it is not satis￿ed, update
it by the relaxation method
e2 = ￿ee0 + (1 ￿ ￿e)e1;
where 0 < ￿e < 1 is the relaxation coe¢ cient for the enrollment rate.
5. Using the decision rules obtained in step 3, As(a;j) 8j;8a, and equation (18), compute the age-
dependent distributions by forward recursion. Then use these distributions ￿
s(a;j) and the age shares










where n is the growth rate of cohort size. Check the convergence criterion (
jK￿K1j
K ￿ tolK) to see if it
needs to stop. If not, use the relaxation method to update K
K2 = ￿KK0 + (1 ￿ ￿K)K1;
where 0 < ￿K < 1 is the relaxation coe¢ cient for capital. Then set K0 = K2; e0 = e2, and go back to
step 1. The iteration will stop once all errors fall into the tolerance ranges.
286. Compute aggregate consumption, investment, tuition expense, and output by using the decision rules,

















X = (n + ￿)K:
7. Finally, check if the market clearing condition given by equation (22) holds. If it does, stop.
10 Appendix C. Algorithm to Compute the Transition Path
In this paper I follow Chen, • Imrohoro… glu and • Imrohoro… glu (2006) (also see Conesa and Kreuger (1999)) in
computing a transition path from the initial pre-1951 steady state towards a ￿nal steady state. In this way,
I view 1952-2000 as a part of the transition path. De￿ning notation, I use t = 1 for 1951, t = T for the ￿nal
steady state, and t = 2;:::;T ￿ 1 for the transitional period. I take the following steps in the computation.
1. Compute the pre-1951 initial steady state by following the method described in Appendix B. Save the
distribution ￿
s(a;j);8j;8s for later calculation.
2. Feed in the exogenous change in the growth rate of HSGs￿cohort size fntgT
t=1, transformed capital-
speci￿c technological change fBtgT
t=1, and the tuition payments ftuitiontgT
t=1.
3. Compute the ￿nal steady state at t = T. Save the value function V s(a;j);8j;8s for later calculation.
4. Take the initial and ￿nal steady state values of capital stock K and enrollment rate e, and use linear
interpolation to guess the sequences of fKtgT
t=1 and fetgT
t=1. This is the initial guess for the transition
path computation.
5. Start from T ￿ 1, take the value function of the ￿nal steady state as the terminal values V s(a;j;T),
solve the individual optimization problem by backward induction, and obtain the decision rules for all
cohorts through the transition path.
6. Use the distribution of the pre-1951 steady state as the initial asset distribution, together with the
decision rules collected from step 5, and calculate f￿
s(a;j;t)gT
t=2 by forward recursion. Then use them
to calculate new fKtgT
t=1 and fetgT
t=1.
7. Compare the new sequences of endogenous variables fKtgT
t=1 and fetgT
t=1 with the initial guess and
iterate until convergence.














Source: Katz and Autor (1999)
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Figure 1: The Skill Premium (Log Units) and Relative Supply of Skilled Labor: 1949-1996























Figure 2: High School Graduates Cohort Size


























Figure 3: College Age Population: 1955-2000
























Figure 4: College Enrollment Rate of High School Graduates: 1948-2001




























Figure 5: Average Real TFRB charges: 1948-2001











































































































































Figure 8: Lifecycle CG Wage Pro￿le: 1955 Cohort












Figure 9: CDF of Disutility Cost













Figure 10: Age E¢ ciency Unit Pro￿le: 1949-2002 Average
















































Figure 11: Lifecycle Pro￿les of HSG and CG









Source: Cummins and Violante (2002)
Figure 12: Investment-Speci￿c Technological Change (Log Units)














Figure 13: Model vs. Data: Benchmark Case













Figure 14: Model vs. Data: Demographic Change Only














Figure 15: Model vs. Data: ISTC Only
















Figure 16: Skill Premium: Model vs. Data












Figure 17: Capital-Skill Labor Ratio: Decomposition










Figure 18: Relative Supply of Skilled Labor: Decomposition














Figure 19: Skill Premium: Sensitivity Analysis
39